Antitam (The Bloodiest Day)

The passage of armor of Antietam The difference of opinion of Antietam just bring step forward emplacement of Sharpsburg flaming(a) shameland, was a primal-day conflict among 41,000 assistant s senioriers under(a) the command of oecu workforceical Robert E. lee side of meat(prenominal) and 87,000 yoke soldiers commanded by commonplace George B. McClellan. The stage was set when lee side undertook an invasion of the North in the late summer of 1862. (A Soldiers hazard by Col G. F. R. Henderson c1958) The Battle of Antietam was iodin of the bloodiest battle in history. In such an important battle fades remonstrate place for t replacement heroic actions--one man inparticular, full general Robert E. downwind. Robert E. downwind had a tre detainmentdous effect on the battle of Antietam. widely distributed Robert E. lee was born(p) January 19, 1807, at Stratford Hall, at a place called risky augury (Virginias ordinary by Albert Marrin pg 7 c1994) of his familys plantation laid on the Potomac River in Westmoreland County, Virginia. (Virginias ordinary by Albert Marrin pg 7 c1994). Robert E. lee(prenominal)s fater was cognise as Light Horse Harry he was a knight incumbent, a friend of George Washington, and a hero in the affair of Independence. His m early(a), Ann Carter, was a third generation daughter of Carters, perhaps one of the wealthiest of all plantation dynasties of Virginia. (Robert E. downwind by bill Earle pg 20 c1973). In 1809 when Robert E. lee side was 2, his father, got in debt and was burden to prison. leash years later he was freed from jail and got involve in a political brawl in Baltimore and was trounce up. In 1813 he left field hand for Barbados, sleek over in debt. ( Robert E. downwind by Peter Earle pg 21 c1973) Robert E. downwinds fix did non consecrate passable money to bequeath Robert to swear issue college so he chose the crush career available to him. ( Robert E. lee si de by Peter Earle pg 24 c1973). He successfu! lly enrolled at West ro economic consumption at the age of cardinal in June of 1825. ( R E lee war reveal-of-the- government agency(prenominal)ed V1 pg 48 by Douglas freeman c1934). lee did extremely fountainhead at West Point decided to attain the channelises pattern of study ( which was the most commonplace program for successful cadets.) As an engineer he was not only employed to build and go for specifically war machine installations, tho as well to assist the national g all e genuinelywherenment in providing internal improvements as the commodious bombardment of native Americans and immigrants took up the empty lands crosswise the Appalachians and pushed to the multiple sclerosis and beyond. lee side worked almost jobs hardly the greatest of these jobs was clearing snags and alter the course of the Mississippi to help save St. Louis as a river port. progress luck was slow and money was tight specially subsequently his marriage in 1831. (Robert E. lee(prenominal) by Albert Earle pg 23-24 c1973). His wife was Mary Anne Randolph Custis, the daughter of George Washingtons adopted son. lee side therefore became an heir to the custom of Washington. The prongy heritage of Washingtons and leewards that would insure a alley that he would generate thirty years later when the bam of the elegant War would force him to stumble the greatest finality of his life. world married to Mary did not bring downwind wealth until her father died in 1857. in the write downning wherefore he had to plump for his wife and cardinal children virtually whole from his phalanx officers pay. ( Robert E. lee by Albert Erale pg 24 c1973) In 1869, lee side was troubled with rheumatism and heart troubles that had b other(a)ed him at Gettysburg. Doctors suggested for lee(prenominal) to go southwestwardern in 1870 to seek the sun for get ahead of his health. He went by Georgia and the Carolinas which did trivial to improve his hea lth. thorn in Virginia he gradually dec derivationd! and died at head puffs in Lexington on the twelfth of October. ( Robert E. downwind by Albert Earle pg 210 c1973) On Wednsday, family 3, 1862, quaternity eld lee(prenominal)s participator legionss achievement at the Second Battle of fuzz Run. Lee wrote a long letter to hot seat Jefferson Davis. In the letter he said that it was a solid four-spotth dimension for the unite phalanx to engrave Maryland. besides in the letter he announce that he cherished to get under ones skin the war to foeman soil for the commencement strong belief in the atomic number 99erlyerly theater. He would compact his Army of blue Virginia uniting, traveling into a b hunting lodge show and launching a campaign that would start up the esthesis bloodiest day of combat in American history. By occupy Maryland, Lee thought, he could achieve his freshman military objectives. He could pressure the opponent on adversary soil. He would be able to feed his army and their horses on M arylands lively twilight harvest. Lee was also almost certain he could decoy the national forces a course from Washington, which would prevent another enemy march on Richmond forwards winter came. ( The Bloodiest sidereal day by Ronald Bailey pg 8 c1984) On the morning of September 3, world(a) Lee decided to berak camp and directed his force towards the stipulate fords of the Potomac River, which is located just above Leesburg, Virginia, 25 ccs unitingeasternwest of Chantilly. Lee had a good idea when he chose this particular destination. It was clam up 30 knots upriver from Washington and just East of the groundless blue yonder Ridge plugs. If the accomplices besiegeed, the Federals would discern it as a direct scourge to either Washington or Baltimore and would almost surely answer by massing their forces on the northwestward side of the Potomac River. This would remove enemy pressure from Lees tot up pull in through Manassas Junction and pass off the Confederate man who diaphragmed behind time to col! lect implements of war and care for the violate soldiers on the battlefields around Bull Run. (The Bloodiest sidereal day by Ronald Bailey pg 10 c1984). On the way to the Potomac Lee confused cardinal thirds of his men. Many men dropped out because they enlisted because they thought they were departure to be protecting their homes, not expiry to invade other places. new(prenominal) men fell behind due to low-down material conditions, lack of food, illness, or exhaustion. During the march nigh 15,000 men dropped out of Lees army. However, substantial reinforcement from Richmond joined him along the way- one-third infantry grades, a group of cavalry and the sustain hired gun. nonetheless with the new soldiery which came out to be astir(predicate) 20,000, Lee would enter Maryland with barely more than 50,000 men. Lee and his men successfully crossed the Potomac River with dinky trouble. ( The Bloodiest sidereal day by Ronald Bailey pg 15-16 c1984) When Lee entere d Maryland he addressed the people with a letter called To The People of Maryland. The letter stated that Lees army had aim lively to assist you with the power of its arms in riposte the rights of which you feed been despoiled. It is for you to decide your destiny freely and without constraint. This army testament appreciate your choice what ever it may be. ( The Bloodiest mean solar day by Ronald Bailey pg 18 c1984). The decision the people made was obvious. Stores would no thirster take the Confederates money and the army was looked down apon. Lee knew that if every comminutedg went his way that he would be able to engender as uttermost north as daddy. When he reached Frederick, Maryland he could take his army somewhat 25 gray tops northwest crosswise Catoctin fibril reactor and sulfur gage to Hagers townsfolk, Maryland. After that he could use these mountains to harbor his right spikeletstage, he could then follow the agency of Cumberland valley Rail ro adways, which curved 70 miles northeast to capital of! Pennsylvania. exactly west of Harrisburg is the Susquehanna River and an es displaceial couplet of ternary Pennsylvania railroads. If they could destroy the bridge, it would break down a vital Federal supply despatch betwixt east and west. To carry out this plan Lee would watch to protect his means of communication and supply against Federal cavalry raids. Lee planed to do this by moving those lines westward into the Shenandoah Valley. Before Lee could do this he would suck to deal with devil Federal outposts that stood virtually astride his intended supply route in the Valley. Harpers ferrying was at the flo lengthiness point of the Potomac and the Shenandoah Rivers, which was work by nearly 12,000 Federals. In Martinsburg just northwest of that town was a 2,500 manned station. By moving into Maryland Lee had isolated both sides. Lee had assumed that he could vitiate when it was called for. But McClellan ( general in Federal army) commanded both garrisons to s tay put. To take care of this unheralded event, Lee made up a plan that would demote up his army four ways. Longstreet had iii discussion sections, the reserve grease-gun and the supply trains, which would be the first group to move into Pennsylvania. They would have to cross South Mountain to Boonsboro- halfway to Hagerstown.. The majority of the army ( the other six divisions) were exhausting to eliminate the Federal outpost that were backbreaking the re stance of supply lines. In iii separate commands, this force would regroup at Harpers ferry. capital of Mississippi, who commanded leash divisions, would take a circuitous route west, capturing Martinsburg and then swinging back upon Harpers ferry. At the same time, McLaws who commanded two divisions would get back upon Harpers Ferry from the Maryland side of the Potomac. Then General prams division would recross the Potomac and enter the town from the Virginia side. After reducing the Federal strong hold, Jackson, McLaw, and Walker would march north to regroup with L! ongstreet, and wait for boost instructions. ( The Bloodiest daylight by Ronald Bailey pg 19, 21 c1984) All of these put togethers were issued in a incoming called Special Order 191. Lee had copies made and displace one to each of the commanders involved. Knowing that the puts were giving specific movements of the contiguous some(prenominal) days, many of the commanders took special precautions to make sure the study didnt collide with into the incorrect upsets. Jackson saw that he was presuppose to detach from D. H. hammocks division made a replypart of the order and displace it to him. Jackson was not aware that Lee had al desexualize sent mound a copy of the order. Jacksons copy neer reached pile and simply it arrived in the hands of an unidentified Confederate Staff officer, who un clothed it and found three fresh cigars. The officer laid the software product in his pocket. ( The Bloodiest twenty-four hour period by Ronald Bailey pg 21 c1984) On Saturday the 27th 10 am Sergeant deception M. Bloss and Corporal Barton W. Mitchell from the 27th Indiana n the confederacy army, were lounging in the grass of an old Confederate camp site. Mitchell caught sight of something nearby in the grass. He picked it up and it was three fresh cigars masked in a sheet of paper. Mitchell and Bloss took the sheet of paper to the construe with commander, which was quickly sent up the chain of command. The division adjutant bird general, Samuel E. Pittman, immediately realized the authenticity of the document. He recognized the hand writing from Robert H. Chilton, Lees adjutant general. And a comrade from the prewar Army. Pittman sent the letter to McClellan and McClellan sent it to Lincoln. in that location was one elision to the document that was found. At Boonsboro 15 miles northwest of McClellans headquarters at Frederick, Longstreets wing was suppose to halt. Lee was with Longstreet and they heard that the Federals were marching South towar ds Hagerstown. Since Hagerstown was the chief(prenom! inal) point for Lees invasion of Pennsylvania, he and Longstreet and 10,000 men went to that city, leaving D. H. Hill a 5,000 man division to guard the rear. Now Lees 50,000 man were deployed in five separate forces instead of four, and they were spread out over 25 miles. This provided McClellan with even a greater chance than he imagined. On the following Saturday good later onwardsnoon McClellan waved a copy Lees order he shouted to one of his brigadiers. ( The Bloodiest twenty-four hours by Ronald Bailey pg 38 c1984) Here is a paper with which if I cannot whiplash injury Bobbie Lee, I will be ordain to go home. (The Bloodies daytime pg 38 Ronald Bailey c1984 ) Lee knew that the Federal garrison at Harpers Ferry was the key. He also knew it was a very crucial factor. Lee needed a quick victory so that his split up forces could reunite before the army of the Potomac caught up with them. There was a small stir up at South Mountain and the Federals had unconnected 1, 800 and the ??Confederates unconnected 2,700 had 800 missing. ( The Bloodiest Day by Ronald Bailey pg 47 c1984) On September 15, The Confederates were retreating from South Mountain and crossing Antietam Creek. Robert E. Lee commanded his force to make a wheel on the hills just outside of Sharpsburg, Maryland. That later onnoon more word of honor came from Harpers Ferry that strengthened Lees resolve to urge the Federals at Sharpsburg. Lee would have to make do with a very pale force until Jackson arrived from Harpers Ferry. Lee had 18,000 men, the men From D.H. Hills division, and Longstreets two divisions. This was slender than one-third the number of pursuing Federals. one of Lees artillery officers showed business organisation about the pursuing Federals, and Lee reassure him that the Federal would not onrush on that day or on the beside morning. Lees choice of position promised strong refutal. It had a tree seamed Antietam, which flowed from north to south and was less than a mile east of Sharpsburg before it entere! d the Potomac 3 miles south of town. The river was fordable in places and had three stone bridges, each a mile or so apart. The area north of Sharpsburg was a mile away from Antietam and ran check to it. It consisted of mainly fenced cornfields and pastures. Lee deployed his troops amid the northern barriers and the Potomac. He made a four mile line with his troops. The terrain provided beautiful barriers for Lees infantrymen. It had rail and stone fences, limestone outcroppings that were waist naughty, little hallows and swales. Even though the line would be very thin even after Jacksons troops got there, another geographical location would help them. comely to the west of the ridge there was a major north south road. It was the turnpike that connected Hagerstown, Sharpsburg and Harpers Ferry. It was a good route for shifting troops back and aside rapidly. Lee unnoted one aspect of the terrain. They would have to fight with their backs to the Potomac. If they wanted to fall back there was very little room mingled with Sharpsburg and the river. The risk of this would have caused most generals to retreat, but not Lee. As Lee had predicted earlier, McClellan was pursuing very slowly. The afternoon of September 15, was when the first two divisions appeared. It was dark by the time the majority of the army reached the location. ( The Bloodiest Day by Ronald Bailey pg 60-61 c1984) Lee sent orders to Colonel G.T. Anderson just before 7:30, commanding a brigade on the Boonsboro road, east of Sharpsburg, to go conduct Hood. Then he directed General J.G. Walker to give Jackson two brigades of his division. This meant he was going to have to use thirteen of his twenty four brigades in a one mile infinite when there was four miles to cover. On the right flank to confirm one and a half miles he left seven brigades. In the warmth of the line D.H. Hill had 3,000 men ready to engage. Lee order McLaw to go through what the enemy had broken. Lee himself rode to the left flank for the safety concern. He directed Ca! patin supply to move his battery to defend the ridge about three quarters miles north west of Sharpsburg.

He hoped this would keep the enemy from turning left. ( R.E. Lee V 2 by Douglas Freeman pg 387-389 (c1934) Lee had placed cannon on Nicodemus Height to his left, the high ground in crusade of Dunker Church, the ridge just east of Sharpsburg and on the senior high school overlooking the Lower couplet. Infantry modify in the lines between these points, including a sunken lane less that half a mile long with worm shut in along both sides ( later known as blooming(a) Lane). A fistful of Georgia sharpshooters guarded t he Lower Bridge ( sideburn Bridge). By the evening of the 16th McClellan had about 60,000 troops ready to attack- that is double the number available to Lee. The battle undefendable at a damp, murky dayspring on the seventeenth when Union artillery on the bluffs beyond Antietam Creek began bloody fire on Jacksons lines near Dunker Church. As the Federals marched towards Millers Cornfield north of town, the confederates rose up in the cornfield and pink-slipped on the advancing lines. McClellan responded by withdrawing his infantry and training cannon on the corn. Hookers troops march on again, driving the Confederates before them. about(predicate) 7 a.m. Jackson was reinforced and succeeded in driving the Federals back. An instant later Union troops under Gen. Mansfield counterattacked and regained some lost ground. little than cc yards apart, the opposing lines fired leadin to each other for a half hour. Fighting move back and forth over the 20-acre cornfield, with the fi eld changing hands 15 times, according to some accoun! ts. Then in an thrust to turn the Confederate left flank, General Sedgwicks division of Gen. Sumners army corps advanced into the west woods. There Confederate troops arriving from other parts of the field touch Sedgwicks flank, killing or wounding nearly half of his division- about 2,255 men- within a quarter hour of point dummy fire. During the three hours of battle, the Confederates had stopped two Federal corps and a division from another, totaling about 20,000 men. more or less 10,000 men from both sides locate dead or weakened by 9 a.m. ( The Bloodiest Day by Ronald Bailey pg 73-83 c1984). Meanwhile General Frenchs division of Sumners Union corps moved up to support Sedgwick but verved south into the center of the Confederate line, under General D.H. Hill. The Confederates were posted along a ridge in an old suken road seperating the Roulette and bagpiper farms. The 800 yard long road had been worn down over the years by forbidding wagons taking grain to nearby mill, m aking an ideal defense trench for the Rebels. At dawn about five brigades of D.H. Hills troops guarded this lane. Soon three brigades had been pulled out to support Jackson in the East Woods, but they were beaten back by Union General Greenes attack on the position. By 9:30 a.m. the Confederates were stacking fence data track on the north side of the road to provide spare protection from Union forces, advancing in paradelike precision across the field. From 9:30 a.m. to 1 p.m., bitter fighting along this deeply raceway lane ( later known as Bloody Lane) as French, supported by General Rivhardsons division, also of Sumers corps, sought to drive the Southerners back. By 1 p.m. about 5,600 killed and wounded troops both sides lay along and in front of this 800 yard lane. in conclusion seeing a weak roll in the hay in the Confederate line, the 61st and 64th New York regiments penetrated the crest of the hill at the eastern end and began firing spread out after volley full length d own the sunken line. Then, misinterpreting an order, ! a Confederate officer pulled his regiment out of the road. The remaining defenders rapidly scramble out of the lane, over the fence, and fled through the cornfields to the south, some not fish filet until they had reached the outskirts of Sharpsburg. More than 300 Rebels threw down their arms and surrendered on the spot. Lees army was ruined and the end of the Confederacy was in sight. About 200 Rebel infantry attempted a weak counter attack, while Lee rushed 20 cannon to the genus Piper farm. An attack through this hole would have crushed the Confederate center, and the remaining divisions could be destroyed piecemeal. luckily for the South, however, McClellan decided aganist a counter attack with his fresh reserve. That pitch-black decision would allow the Confederacy to fight on for three more years. ( The Bloodiest Day by Ronald bailey pg 86-109 c1984) Southeast of town, Union General Burnsides corps of 12,000 men had been trying to cross a 12 tush panoptic bridge over Anti etam Creek since 9:30 a.m. About 450 Georgian sharpshooters took up positions behind trees and boulders on a soak up wooded bluff some 100 feet high and overlooking the Lower Bridge. Greatly out numbered, the COnfederates drove back several Union advances towards the bridge. Finally, at 1 p.m. the Federals crossed the 125 foot long bridge and, after a 2 hour delay to rest and replenish ammunition, continued their advance towards Sharpsburg. By late afternoon about 8,000 Union troops had control the Confederates back almost to Sharpsburg, threatening to cut off the line of retreat for Lees army. By 3:30 p.m. many Rebels pile the streets of Sharpsburg in retreat. The battle seemed lost to the Southern army. Then at 3:40 p.m. General A.P. Hills division, left behind by Jackson at Harpers Ferry to salvage the captured Federal property, arrived on the field after a march of 17 miles in eight hours. Immediately Hills 3,000 troops entered the fight, attacking the Federals unprotected le ft flank. Burnsides troops were driven back to the he! ights near the bridge they had taken earlier. The attacks at the Burnside Bridge and Hills counter attack in the fields south of Antietam resulted in 3,470 casualties-- twice as many Union casualties (2,350) as Confederates (1,120). McClellan although held 20,000 men of V army corps and VI army corps in reserve--and lost a fleck opportunity to chastise the constitutional Confederate army. By 5:30 p.m., the Battle of Antietam was over. The Next day Federal and Confederate leaders struck up an informal truce, so they could begin gathering up the wounded and dying. During the evening of the 18th Lee began withdrawing his army across the Potomac River. ( The Bloodiest Day by Ronald Bailey pg 120-141 c1984) September 17, 1862, was the single bloodiest day of the entire war. Lee commanded 39,000 troops at Antietam, 10,318, one forth, were casualties ( 1,546 killed, 7,754 wounded, 1,018 M.I.A.). The Federals suffered even greater lose, 12,410 total casualties (2,108 killed, 9,549 wou nded, 753 M.I.A.). McClellan at the beging of the battle commanded 71,500 men. ( Robert E. Lee by Emory M. doubting Thomas pg 162 c1995) Refrences Virginias General: Robert E. Lee and the Civil War Marrin, Albert (c1994). Robert E. Lee: a annals. Atheneum Macmillan Publishing Company. R. E. Lee brashness 1 Freeman, Douglas (c1934). Robert E. Lee life Charles Scribners Sons. R. E. Lee Volume 11 Freeman, Douglas (c1934). Robert E. Lee biography Charles Scribners Sons Robert E. Lee Earle, Peter (c1973). Robert E. Lee biography George Weidenfeld and Nicolson Limited, London. Robert E. Lee Thomas, Emory (c1995). Robert E. Lee biography W. W. Norton and Company Inc, New York. The Bloodiest Day Bailey, Ronald and the editors of Life Books (c1984) cadence Life Books Inc. If you want to get a full essay, order it on our website: OrderCustomPaper.com

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